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IP Misuse and Innovation Harm
Thomas F. Cotter
Christina Bohannan’s recent article, IP Misuse as Foreclosure,1 presents a
provocative approach to thinking about the patent and copyright misuse
doctrines.2 In brief, Professor Bohannan argues (1) that equating misuse
with a violation of substantive antitrust law is ill-advised;3 (2) that defining
misuse as an attempt to obtain rights beyond the scope of the IP grant is
inherently vague;4 and (3) that misuse nevertheless has a role to play in
penalizing assertions of IP rights that threaten to foreclose competition,
innovation, or access to the public domain.5 As some of my own previous
scholarship on the misuse doctrine demonstrates, I agree with much of
Professor Bohannan’s analysis. In particular, I agree with Professor
Bohannan’s conclusions that merely equating misuse with certain violations
of substantive antitrust law is probably unwise;6 that the “beyond the scope”
rationale nevertheless is vague;7 and that misuse doctrine might provide a
useful tool for penalizing assertions of IP rights (principally copyright
rights) that would foreclose access to the public domain and thus impinge

 Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank
Sanjiv Laud for research assistance. Any errors that remain are mine.
1. Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475 (2011).
2. As discussed in Professor Bohannan’s paper, misuse is an affirmative defense to a
claim for patent or copyright infringement. If the infringement defendant successfully proves
that the plaintiff has misused its patent or copyright, “the patent or copyright is rendered
unenforceable until the misuse is ‘purged.’” See id. at 478. According to most authorities, the
infringer need not be a victim of the alleged misuse; in other words, there is no “standing”
requirement. See id. at 477–78 (“Thus, the doctrine benefits primarily infringers, including
infringers who have not been in any way injured by the misuse but instead argue that the IP
holder has misused the IP right against others.”).
3. See id. at 487–95.
4. See id. at 495–97.
5. See id. at 503–25.
6. See Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent Misuse Doctrine 3–9
(Minn. Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 10-30, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=16
16275. My reasons for reaching this conclusion differ somewhat from those Professor
Bohannan advances, however. Compare id. (questioning the need for a misuse doctrine that
merely duplicates substantive antitrust law), with Bohannan, supra note 1, at 490–95 (arguing
that misuse, “a creature of IP law,” should not necessarily depend on proof of the same factors
that are relevant to antitrust liability).
7. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 10–11.
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upon free speech.8 That said, for reasons presented below I remain skeptical
about Professor Bohannan’s call for courts to apply misuse doctrine to
combat harms to competition and innovation in a manner that would depart
from standard antitrust law,9 at least to the extent that she contemplates
fairly widespread use of the doctrine in this fashion.10 My remarks in this
Essay will therefore focus on what I shall refer to herein as “innovation
harm.”
To illustrate Professor Bohannan’s argument about innovation harm,
suppose that a patent owner will agree to license a prospective licensee only
if the prospective licensee agrees to “Condition X.” Condition X could be
just about anything. Common examples might include a price term (i.e., the
licensee agrees not to sell goods incorporating the patented invention below
some specified price); a commitment to purchase or license some other
product or patent from the patentee (or not to purchase some other
product or patent from someone else); a field-of-use restriction; or a
grantback or reach-through royalty.11 One possible response of the legal
system would be to tolerate the patentee’s insistence on Condition X,
whatever Condition X might happen to be, on the ground that patentees
should be able to dictate whatever terms of use they like, regardless of the
consequences. No one, I suspect, would support this position if taken
literally; at the very least, one would assume that Condition X must be
something that is otherwise lawful.12 A more temperate view would be that
the patentee may extract whatever condition she likes, as long as the
condition does not violate some other legal obligation. On this view, the
patentee would not be free to insist upon the purchaser’s or licensee’s
acquiescence in a tying arrangement that violates substantive antitrust law,
but would be free to insist upon acquiescence in a tying arrangement that
antitrust law condones.13 The law is (now) clear that antitrust evaluates the
8. See id. at 17–18; Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 903, 962 (2007)
[hereinafter Cotter, Misuse]; Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1271, 1301–03 (2008).
9. See Bohannan, supra note 1, at 514–15 (proposing that courts find misuse when there
is “some realistic possibility of harm to innovation” that is “not justified by offsetting
efficiencies”). Elsewhere, she uses the term “restraints on innovation,” see, for example, id. at
511, or “harm to IP policy,” see id. at 500. I understand her use of these three terms to be
synonymous. As indicated above, however, in this Essay I will use the term “innovation harm” to
refer to these concepts.
10. As I have put it before, I adhere to the view that successful assertions of the misuse
defense should remain “safe, legal, and rare.” Cotter, Misuse, supra note 8, at 903.
11. For more on grantbacks and reach-through royalties, see Bohannan, supra note 1, at
518–23.
12. A patent may not be a “hunting license,” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536
(1966); but neither is it, pace James Bond, a license to kill.
13. Under standard antitrust law, the four elements of a “per se” tying violation are: “(1)
the tying and tied goods are two separate products; (2) the defendant has market power in the
tying product market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no choice but to purchase the tied
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legality of tying arrangements involving patents (and, presumably,
copyrights) in the same way it evaluates the legality of tying arrangements
that do not involve IP.14 A virtue of this approach is that it avoids creating
multiple and potentially conflicting standards for evaluating the legality of
Condition X.15 It also largely avoids the need for courts to favor competition
over IP policy, or vice versa, in determining the legality of Condition X;
ownership of a patent is not a defense to an otherwise valid antitrust tying
claim.16 Nevertheless, the ability to avoid such conflicts is not absolute. Like
it or not, courts sometimes may have to determine whether ownership of a
valid patent is a sufficient justification for allowing, say, the patentee to
condition a license on the licensee’s agreement to a grantback or reachthrough royalty, or to settle infringement litigation by paying the defendant
to delay entry.17 In such cases, there may be no ready demarcation between
the lawful and unlawful exercise of patent rights; courts may have to choose
which policy will prevail in a given case.18 Again, though, nothing so far has
suggested that the legality of Condition X need be determined in light of
anything other than antitrust standards, though sometimes those standards
may need to take into account the importance of the patent or copyright
incentive scheme.
Professor Bohannan argues, however, that in some instances antitrust
law would condone the patentee’s imposition of Condition X, whereas IP
law should not do so because of the condition’s potential negative impact on

product from it; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a substantial volume of commerce.”
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
14. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006) (noting that
many tying arrangements, including those involving patents, are consistent with a free market
and holding that “in all cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant has market power in the tying product). To be fair, patent pools, package licenses,
and block booking could all be viewed as variations of tying with respect to which the courts
apply (or have applied) a somewhat different approach. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §§ 4.2, 5.5–.6
(1995) (discussing patent pools); Cotter, supra note 6, at 17 n.80 (citing package license and
block booking cases).
15. It also renders the misuse defense duplicative, and thus arguably irrelevant, unless the
addition of the misuse defense is necessary for attaining the optimal deterrence of substantive
antitrust violations. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 3–9, 17 (noting, but casting doubt on this
rationale).
16. See Thomas F. Cotter, Reflections on the Antitrust Modernization Commission’s Report and
Recommendations Relating to the Antitrust/IP Interface, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 745, 748 n.5 (2008)
(stating and citing sources for the proposition that “IP law confers no general right to flout
antitrust law”).
17. On “reverse payment” agreements to settle pharmaceutical patent litigation, see
generally, C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003).
18. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 16; Cotter, supra note 16, at 796–97.
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innovation.19 In one sense, the existence of such cases might seem
unremarkable. The entire structure of patent and copyright rights, after all,
can be viewed (ideally) as an effort to attain the maximum surplus of social
benefits over costs, where the costs and benefits include both short-term
effects (such as monopoly and transaction costs) as well as long-term
consequences (such as the impact on future innovation).20 Put another way,
roughly speaking patent and copyright law trade off a degree of short-term
(static) efficiency in exchange for prospective long-term (dynamic) gains.
Where the short-term costs likely outweigh the long-term gains, however—or
where the exercise of IP rights would tend to undermine, rather than
enhance, long-term gains—IP doctrine itself (ideally) imposes limitations on
IP rights. Examples would include the idea–expression and fact–expression
dichotomies in copyright, as well as copyright’s fair use and other
exceptions. In patent law, common examples would include doctrines such
as nonobviousness and enablement.
Matters become more complicated, however, when IP law itself does not
clearly address the legality of certain exercises of IP rights, and the longterm effects of those practices are ambiguous. To clarify, suppose that a
patentee’s insistence upon Condition X poses some risk to long-term
innovation, but that the risk is not quite salient enough to merit scrutiny
under current antitrust law. (As I have discussed in other work, scholars
sometimes posit antitrust doctrine as a tool for minimizing the aggregate
cost of “false positives,” or wrongly condemning procompetitive conduct;
“false negatives,” or wrongly exonerating anticompetitive conduct; and
administrative costs.21 Thus, in some contexts a speculative threat of
anticompetitive harm may be insufficient to condemn a practice that
plausibly promises some procompetitive benefit, particularly when the cost
of accurately distinguishing pro- from anticompetitive behavior is high.) In
theory, it might make sense to invoke some IP doctrine (misuse, fair use,
preemption—something of sufficient flexibility to cover the situation at
hand) and prohibit the patentee from imposing Condition X, on the
ground that the risk of harm to long-term innovation, though perhaps
remote, is of sufficient gravity as to outweigh a small interference with the IP
incentive scheme. To illustrate, suppose that one could calculate that
tolerating the imposition of Condition X poses a ninety percent chance of
having on net a small positive effect on long-term innovation (perhaps
because inventors will be encouraged by the possibility of deriving future
profits from the licensing of patents that impose Condition X), but a ten
19. See Bohannan, supra note 1, at 507–17 (arguing that misuse of IP rights can frustrate
innovation apart and aside from antitrust law).
20. See, e.g., Cotter, Misuse, supra note 8, at 940 (“The optimal IP system would maximize
the surplus of social benefits over social costs.”).
21. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 483, 490–91 (2006).
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percent chance of having on net a catastrophic negative effect on long-term
innovation (because Condition X could inhibit the development of some
application of or improvement on the patented invention that would have
significant positive spillover effects).22 In such a case, it might make sense
for IP law to step in and prohibit Condition X, even if antitrust law, ever
cognizant of the risk of false positives, would not. Indeed, I have argued
before that some IP doctrines, including some applications of fair use and of
trademark law’s functionality doctrine, can be understood along these
lines.23
For present purposes, the question is whether there are circumstances
like the one sketched out above, in which Condition X poses an undue risk
to future innovation but neither antitrust nor other IP doctrines are up to
the task of prohibiting the condition, such that misuse (perhaps by default)
is the best available means to fill the gap. In this regard, Professor Bohannan
suggests that a finding of misuse might have been appropriate in cases such
as U.S. Philips Corp. v. International Trade Commission,24 Princo Corp. v.
International Trade Commission,25 and Lasercomb v. Reynolds.26 At first blush,
her position has some appeal. In all three cases, the probability that the
restraints at issue would have foreclosed competition in any meaningful
sense might have been too speculative to support antitrust liability.27
Deploying IP doctrine to condemn restraints like the ones at issue in these
cases nevertheless might make sense, as long as courts could be reasonably
certain that (1) condemning them would have little if any negative impact
on IP incentives, and (2) the short-term efficiency consequences would be
either positive or of minimal importance. When both conditions are

22. To complicate matters further, Condition X is also likely to have some short-term
consequences as well, which could be either positive or negative depending on the
circumstances. A patent pool or package license, for example, may decrease short-term
transaction costs, whereas a resale price condition could have both positive and negative shortterm effects.
23. See Cotter, supra note 21, at 506–20 (discussing the fair use and functionality doctrines
and their affect on competition policy).
24. 424 F.3d 1179, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a package-licensing arrangement
did not constitute patent misuse). See Bohannan, supra note 1, at 510 (noting, however, that
“[p]ackage licensing will not always cause foreclosure”).
25. 616 F.3d 1318, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that an alleged agreement
between patent owners/joint venturers to suppress a rival technology did not constitute patent
misuse). See Bohannan, supra note 1, at 512–15 (discussing Princo).
26. 911 F.2d 970, 976–77 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a license provision requiring
licensees not to compete in marketing a type of software product for ninety-nine years
constituted copyright misuse). See Bohannan, supra note 1, at 512 (noting the outcome in
Lasercomb and its impact on the misuse doctrine).
27. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 7 (noting that antitrust liability might have been difficult to
prove in Princo); Cotter, Misuse, supra note 8, at 920–27 (discussing whether conventional
antitrust tying doctrine would have permitted the package licensing at issue in U.S. Philips, and
suggesting that antitrust liability was unlikely in Lasercomb).
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present, the reduction of even a remote probability of harm to future
innovation would seem to be well worth avoiding.
The problem, as I see it, is that in none of the three cases above could
one be entirely confident that both conditions were satisfied. Condemning
the package licensing in U.S. Philips could, in theory, increase innovation
harm by making it more difficult to reduce the transaction costs attendant
upon the licensing of complementary patents.28 Similarly, in Princo,
condemning the alleged agreement between joint venturers to favor one
technology over another might have discouraged future technological joint
ventures, by removing a means by which the venturers could commit
themselves to refrain from opportunistic conduct that might undermine the
venture.29 And while it’s hard to imagine that prohibiting the specific
condition at issue in Lasercomb (which prevented licensees from selling a
competing product for ninety-nine years) would have much of an effect on
IP incentives, the broader implications of the case—that courts will in effect
render copyrights unenforceable when licensors include what a court deems
to be a substantively unconscionable term in a licensing agreement—may
pose more of a risk to future innovation than might at first seem apparent.30
28. See Cotter, supra note 6, at 17.
29. See id. at 7 (expressing no opinion, however, on whether the effects of the agreement
alleged in Princo would have been, on net, pro- or anticompetitive).
30. See Cotter, Misuse, supra note 8, at 925–27. On the other hand, perhaps one could
analogize the restraint at issue in Lasercomb to a more familiar type of agreement—an employee
noncompete. Commentators have long noted that employee noncompete agreements rarely
result in the imposition of antitrust liability. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Revisiting the “Neglected
Stepchild”: Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 621, 666
(concluding that federal antitrust law had largely ignored employee noncompetes). From an
antitrust perspective this probably makes sense, however, because the typical employer lacks the
market power that might give rise to a plausible antitrust claim in this context. See Gillian
Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis¸ 76 IND.
L.J. 49, 61 (2001); Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A
Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 712–18 (1985). Moreover, it is certainly possible to muster
a variety of plausible business justifications in support of noncompetes, among them the role of
noncompetes in encouraging employers to share valuable information with employees. See, e.g.,
Lester, supra, at 60–71 (critically appraising various proposed economic justifications for
noncompetes). On the other hand, noncompetes also pose an obvious threat to employee
mobility, which can be not only normatively problematic (the employee is not an indentured
servant, after all) but also, by interfering with the spread of employee know-how, may diminish
the overall level of innovation in an economy. Indeed, a few states, including California, view
these negative consequences as being of sufficient gravity to justify outlawing employee
noncompetes altogether, subject to a few exceptions. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West
2008); see also ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (arguing that a culture of employee mobility was a
significant factor in the success of Silicon Valley in comparison with Massachusetts’ Route 128).
For an overview of relevant literature on the law and economics of noncompetes, see Orly
Lobel, Intellectual Property and Restrictive Covenants, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW AND ECONOMICS ch. 18 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2009). The law’s treatment of
employee noncompetes thus may provide an interesting parallel for Professor Bohannan’s idea
that misuse doctrine should condemn certain restraints that interfere with innovation, even
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Alternatively, if one believes that the possibility of harm to future innovation
was sufficiently strong to merit condemnation of the types of practices at
issue in U.S. Philips, Princo, and Lasercomb, perhaps antitrust law should loosen
up some of its concerns over false positives and in similar cases find practices
of this sort to be in violation of the Sherman Act.31
I suspect that Professor Bohannan might respond to this line of
reasoning by arguing that her concern is not necessarily with antitrust harm
at all, but rather with what she views as a distinct harm to future
innovation.32 In my view, however, innovation harm of the type that
concerns Professor Bohannan is a harm that can (and should) be taken into
account in conventional antitrust analysis when the facts so warrant.
Suppose, for example, that Condition X requires a licensee to refrain from
using the licensed patent or copyright for certain purposes; or (as in
Professor Bohannan’s examples relating to reach-through royalties and
grantbacks) to convey future revenues from, or rights in, inventions that
incorporate or build upon the licensed IP rights.33 Conditions of this nature
surely can have a negative impact on future innovation, but it seems to me
that antitrust law as it currently exists already recognizes this possibility.
Under conventional antitrust analysis, the legality of Condition X would
depend upon whether that potential harm to future innovation is both
substantial (which in turn depends upon the probability and magnitude of
the potential harm) and unjustified by plausible procompetitive benefits
(both static and dynamic).34 For misuse to have any additional bite, then, in

when they do not threaten cognizable antitrust harm; this parallel might be worth pursuing in
future work.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). This is not to say that I am necessarily advocating this view. A
court that condemns a restraint because of the restraint’s impact on future innovation must
have some basis for concluding that the net impact on innovation will be negative, and it’s not
clear to me that contemporary antitrust law systematically underestimates those effects (though
there is surely room for improvement in our understanding of how restraints affect innovation).
My point is merely that antitrust law has an existing framework for addressing these problems,
and that I am not confident that courts applying misuse doctrine would be any better poised
than are courts applying antitrust law to predict net future harms to innovation—particularly if,
as Professor Bohannan rightly urges, courts applying misuse doctrine should only condemn
restraints when “some appreciable harm to innovation is possible and that the conduct is not
justified by offsetting efficiencies.” Bohannan, supra note 1, at 514–15; see also id. at 510
(“[T]here must be more than pure speculation that the rival’s efforts would have come to
fruition but for the IP holder’s conduct.”).
32. See Bohannan, supra note 1, at 496. Professor Bohannan recognizes, however, that the
two harms may sometimes converge. See id. at 497 (“Because competition and innovation are
related, conduct that is anticompetitive is often also anti-innovative.”).
33. See id. at 519–23.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50–51, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(affirming a finding that Microsoft’s conduct posed a sufficient threat to certain nascent
markets to justify the imposition of liability under Sherman Act § 2); Cotter, supra note 16, at
748 n.5 (stating that antitrust “can and does consider harm to both static and dynamic
efficiency”).
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combating innovation harm, it would have to reach conduct that antitrust
law would not condemn.
In this regard, Professor Bohannan suggests, if I understand correctly,
that misuse doctrine sometimes should condemn conditions imposed by IP
owners who lack market power (and who therefore would, by virtue of their
lack of market power, most likely prevail against an antitrust challenge).35
Absent market power on the part of the IP owner, though, it’s not clear to
me how a court can be confident that the condition at issue poses any
serious threat to future innovation. By definition, a lack of market power
would seem to imply that adequate substitutes for the IP rights in question
exist, which in turn means that the prospective licensee could turn to other
sources for the technology it needs to build its own innovations.36 In
addition, Professor Bohannan (rightly, in my view) recognizes that
arrangements such as grantbacks and reach-throughs might have
compensating efficiency justifications that should immunize at least some of
them even under her more aggressive misuse regime.37 Perhaps, then, a
stronger showing of such efficiencies should be necessary to rebut the
misuse defense than would be required in an antitrust context. Without at
least a rough sense of how much stronger the evidence of compensating
efficiencies must be, however, to rebut misuse (or how much stronger the
evidence of dynamic efficiency losses must be to support misuse), I fear that
courts will be free to find misuse in a broad range of cases in which, on
balance, enforcing the condition at issue (and any otherwise valid patent or
copyright claims asserted by the IP owner) would have been welfareenhancing.38
35. See Bohannan, supra note 1, at 491–95.
36. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, § 2.2 (stating that
“[m]arket power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output below, competitive
levels for a significant period of time,” but that the agencies will not presume that patents
confer market power because “there will often be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes
for such product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power” (footnotes
omitted)).
37. See Bohannan, supra note 1, at 519–23.
38. A possible rejoinder to my argument—that antitrust should address innovation harm,
if the risk of incurring such harm is substantial, and thus render the misuse doctrine
nugatory—is that misuse is a lesser penalty than antitrust liability. As a result, in the context of
misuse the potential cost of a false positive is less than it is in the context of antitrust. A finding
of misuse, after all, only renders a patent unenforceable (and only until the misuse is purged);
it does not render the patentee liable for treble damages and attorney’s fees, as does a finding
of antitrust liability. Depending on the circumstances, though, rendering a patent
unenforceable might be a substantially more onerous penalty than treble the amount of some
inherently speculative award of damages for future harm. In addition, misuse (unlike antitrust)
lacks a standing requirement, thus potentially increasing the number of settings in which a
misuse defense might be raised. See id. at 477–78. If the penalty for misuse were more finely
tailored, however, the rejoinder would have greater purchase. One possibility might be to
reform the misuse doctrine by rendering only the offending condition enforceable, thus leaving
the patent itself intact, and by imposing a standing requirement. See generally Cotter, supra note
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At the end of the day, Professor Bohannan has developed an interesting
method of analysis, and we probably agree more than we disagree. As for
our areas of disagreement, time will tell whether courts come to embrace
Professor Bohannan’s more aggressive approach, or my more cautious
approach, to the misuse doctrine. There is a good deal at stake, and whether
Professor Bohannan’s approach or mine is better for stimulating innovation
remains indeterminate. (To paraphrase Kierkegaard, innovation can only be
understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.39) Perhaps the patent
and copyright systems are less important to innovation than conventional
wisdom (and my own scholarship) sometimes suggests, in which case efforts
to reduce the strength of patent and copyright rights overall might be
worthwhile.40 If so, an expanded misuse doctrine might be one way to
achieve this goal, though probably not the most direct or obvious. Professor
Bohannan’s article nevertheless is an important contribution to the ongoing
debate over the optimal scope of the misuse doctrine. Courts would be welladvised to consider her thoughtful arguments for reform.

6, at 15 n.72; see also Bohannan, supra note 1, at 515 (suggesting that lesser penalties for misuse
may be appropriate in some instances).
39. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, THE ESSENTIAL KIERKEGAARD 12 (Howard V. Hong & Edna H.
Hong eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2000) (1843) (“Philosophy is perfectly right in saying
that life must be understood backward. But then one forgets the other clause—that it must be
lived forward.”).
40. See, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
136–37 (2008) (stating that collaboration can greatly enhance innovation, especially in the
early stages of development); STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM: THE NATURAL
HISTORY OF INNOVATION 230–36 (2010) (arguing that IP protection is often less important to
innovation than are other factors, including collaboration).

